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RESCUING THE RESCUER: REFORMING HOW FLORIDA’S
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW TREATS MENTAL INJURY
OF FIRST RESPONDERS
Travis J. Foels* **
Abstract
The 2016 Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida was the
deadliest terrorist attack in the United States since the September 11
attacks in 2001. With a final death toll of forty-nine people, and fiftythree others wounded, the attack sent shockwaves throughout the city,
state, and nation. People sent condolences to the families of those
affected, prayers for those taken, and praise to first responders and health
care professionals for their hard work and service. What many fail to
consider, however, is the lasting effect such a horrific and traumatic event
can have on the first responders whose job it is to pick up the pieces after
attackers rip the world apart.
This Note begins by discussing the struggle of Gerry Realin, one of
the police officers tasked with removing the bodies of the slain after the
shooting. Officer Realin was deeply affected by the experience, and is
currently in a fight with the state of Florida to have his PTSD covered by
workers’ compensation. Under current Florida law, first responders who
experience psychological trauma on the job are not entitled to paid days
off or to have their medical bills reimbursed by their employer, absent an
accompanying physical injury. This Note argues that the current Florida
workers’ compensation statutory scheme results in unfairness to first
responders, a class of people who put their lives on the line and frequently
risk exposure to dangerous and highly stressful events. In addition, this
Note addresses the constitutional arguments against such laws and
proposes legislative changes necessary to remedy this injustice.
Unfortunately, horrific events such as the Pulse shooting are seemingly
* Editor’s Note: This Note won the Gertrude Brick Prize for the best Note in Spring 2017.
** J.D., University of Florida 2018; B.S., University of Florida 2015. Thank you to my
friends at the Florida Law Review for all of their dedication and hard work. To my mom, a brilliant
workers’ compensation attorney and even better mother, thank you for supporting me in
everything I do, and for your knowledge and expertise in workers’ compensation law. To my dad,
thank you for setting an unreachable standard for what a man, father, and legal professional should
be. To my amazing sisters, thank you for continuing to inspire me with your determination and
drive toward success. Lastly, endless thanks to my fiancé for her patience, encouragement, and
brilliance; you’ve always pushed me to be the best person I can be, and I would not be where I
am without you. Every aspiration I’ve undertaken in life has been met with nothing but guidance,
love, and unwavering support from my family and friends, so this Note is dedicated to them. I
would also like to extend a special thank you to all the first responders who put their lives on the
line every day to keep our society safe. It is my hope that this Note calls attention to the continued
need for legislative reform, enabling injured heroes to finally receive the support they both require
and deserve.
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becoming more frequent, and legislators need to reevaluate the effect
these laws have on the men and women tasked with keeping our society
safe.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 2016, Orlando Police Department Officer Gerry Realin
received a phone call at 8:30 a.m. informing him that he and his seven-
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man hazmat team were to report for duty.1 At first, Officer Realin thought
the call would be routine: assisting the FBI with collecting evidence,
conducting a meth-lab raid, or cleaning up a drug bust—common duties
assigned to hazmat team officers.2 Instead, Officer Realin and his team
were tasked with collecting the forty-nine bodies of deceased victims of
a shooting that had occurred in a local nightclub just a few hours prior.3
This shooting would be the nation’s deadliest mass shooting in history,
and worst terror attack since September 11, 2001.4 Officer Realin and his
team worked nearly around the clock,5 carrying out their inconceivable
task with dignity. They refused to let any other officers assist them with
removing the bodies so that fewer people had to witness the horrific scene
that lay behind the club doors.6
Other Orlando first responders recounted the horrific sight as a lone
gunman opened fire on the unsuspecting club-goers. Julio Salgado, an
EMT who arrived on scene shortly after the attack began, described “rows
of wounded bodies” and “[p]atrons . . . running out of the building with
open wounds, trying to escape.”7 As responding police officers entered
the club, they were met with “chaos and darkness,” the only light in the
building emanating eerily from a lone disco ball, revealing a dance floor
1. Mike Holfeld, Pulse First Responder Still Having Nightmares, Flashbacks, WKMG
CLICKORLANDO (Aug. 23, 2016, 4:35 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/pulse-orlandoshooting/opd-first-responder-i-can-still-see-all-the-blood.
2. Christopher Brennan, Orlando First Responder Cannot Claim PTSD on Workers’
Comp, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 23, 2016, 7:32 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/orlando-responder-claim-ptsd-workers-comp-article-1.2762932; Holfeld, supra note 1;
see also HAZMAT Team, SAFEOPEDIA, https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/1114/hazmat-team
(last visited Feb. 9, 2017) (defining a hazmat team as “an organized group of
professionals . . . specially trained to handle hazardous materials or dangerous goods”).
3. Brennan, supra note 2.
4. Ralph Ellis et al., Orlando Shooting: 49 Killed, Shooter Pledged ISIS Allegiance, CNN
(June 13, 2016, 11:05 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/12/us/orlando-nightclub-shooting/; see
also Wm. Robert Johnston, Worst Terrorist Strikes in the United States, JOHNSTON’S ARCHIVE
(Jan. 2, 2017), http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/terrorism/wrjp255us.html (listing the Pulse
nightclub shooting as the fifth deadliest domestic terror attack of any kind in the past century).
This Note was written prior to the horrific shooting in Las Vegas, Nevada on October 1, 2017 in
which fifty-eight people were killed and at least 500 more were injured. Holly Yan et al., Las
Vegas Shooting: Bodycam Footage Shows First Response, CNN (Oct. 7, 2017, 2:36 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/03/us/las-vegas-shooting-investigation/index.html.
5. Field Sutton, Orlando Police Officer Has PTSD; Could Lose Everything Because of
State Loophole, WFTV (Aug. 19, 2016, 6:29 PM), http://www.wftv.com/news/local/orlandopolice-officer-has-ptsd-could-lose-everything-because-of-state-loophole/426684791.
6. Abe Aboraya, The Politics of PTSD After Pulse First Responder Goes Public with
Diagnosis, WMFE (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.wmfe.org/the-politics-of-ptsd-after-pulse-firstresponder-goes-public-with-diagnosis/64137.
7. Morgan Winsor et al., After Orlando Shooting, First Responders Grapple with
Psychological Toll, ABC NEWS (June 21, 2016, 7:00 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/
orlando-shooting-responders-grapple-psychological-toll/story?id=39992495.
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covered in blood and bullet casings.8 One of the most haunting
descriptions from a first responder involved “a symphony of familiar
ringtones . . . each ring [signifying the] families of the
dead . . . desperately trying to reach their loved ones after learning of the
mass shooting.”9 The brave men and women who worked tirelessly that
night will forever be haunted by what they experienced.
Officer Realin and several other Orlando first responders who
answered the call that night have since been diagnosed with PTSD.10
Officer Realin suffers from hypertension, nightmares, loss of sleep, and
flashbacks to the event.11 He is currently under the care of a psychologist,
psychiatrist, and cardiologist, and has been hospitalized for hypertension
since the incident.12 He returned to work two weeks after the shooting,
but after passing out on the job he began calling in sick, using his
department-given sick days to recover.13 Due to his symptoms, Officer
Realin’s psychiatrist placed him on “no work” status and told him that he
should not return to work due to his debilitating flashbacks and
nightmares.14 Before long, Officer Realin depleted all of his vacation time
and sick days, and the department placed him on paid leave.15 Although
he is currently receiving paid leave from the Orlando Police Department,
Officer Realin and his family are worried that the financial assistance
may stop at any time.16 This worry stems from the fact that, while
8. Id.; see also Jim Ash, Lawmakers Searching for a Workers’ Comp Cure, WUSF NEWS
(Dec. 5, 2016), http://wusfnews.wusf.usf.edu/post/lawmakers-searching-workers-compcure#stream/0 (“Relin [sic] stood for hours in pools of human blood to remove bodies from the
Pulse nightclub.”).
9. Caitlin Doornbos, First Responders ‘Resilient,’ Coping After Pulse Shooting, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (June 25, 2016), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/pulse-orlando-nightclubshooting/os-shooting-first-responder-cope-20160624-story.html.
10. Frances Robles, Orlando Officers Grapple with Trauma and Red Tape After Massacre,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/28/us/orlando-shootingpolice.html (offering officer accounts of struggling to return to work in the aftermath of the Pulse
shooting).
11. Bob Kealing, Local Lawmaker: Time to Re-draft First Responder Workers’
Compensation Laws, WESH 2 NEWS (Sept. 26, 2016, 7:19 PM), http://www.wesh.com/news/
local-lawmaker-time-to-redraft-first-responder-workers-compensation-laws/41839516.
12. Joe Startz on behalf of Gerry Realin, Officer Realin Support Fund, GOFUNDME (Aug.
17, 2016), https://www.gofundme.com/officergerryrealin.
13. Cody Gohl, Pulse First Responder Is in Danger of Losing His Job, NEWNOWNEXT
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.newnownext.com/pulse-nightclub-first-responder-ptsd/08/2016/
?device=1#openuserprofile=4ccfd80303d8cf4c000103d8cf4c.
14. Brennan, supra note 2; Holfeld, supra note 1.
15. Nico Lang, Florida Denies Pulse First Responder Workers’ Comp for PTSD,
ADVOCATE (Aug. 23, 2016, 11:55 AM), http://www.advocate.com/politics/2016/8/23/floridadenies-pulse-first-responder-workmans-comp-ptsd.
16. Christopher Brennan, Orlando First Responder with PTSD Pushes for Mental Health
Care, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 21, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/
national/bill-push-post-orlando-responder-ptsd-coverage-article-1.2801332. Since the spring of
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physical injuries and mental injury that results from physical injury are
fully covered by workers’ compensation laws in Florida, purely mental
injuries are not.17
Current Florida workers’ compensation statutes differentiate between
mental injuries accompanied by a compensable physical injury and
injuries that are purely mental in nature that are unaccompanied by a
physical injury.18 For purely mental injury, also known as mental–mental
injury,19 current statutes do not provide a right for first responders to
receive indemnification,20 such as recouped vacation and sick leave,
reimbursement for medical treatment received prior to the compensation
claim, paid days off, or lost wages.21 Therefore, while Officer Realin is
entitled to continue to have his medical treatment paid for by the police
department, they are under no obligation to reimburse him for any prior
medical expenses or time missed, or to continue to pay his salary.22 A
spokesperson for the police department stated that Officer Realin can
apply for compensation through the department’s disability committee,
and if he can prove that his injury inhibited his ability to work and was
suffered on the job, his time could be reimbursed.23 However, Officer
Realin and his attorney argue that this process typically adheres to the
protocols set forth by the state workers’ compensation statutes.24
Compensation through that channel is therefore far from certain, and is
often subject to lengthy bureaucratic struggles.25 Faced with the
2017 when this Note was completed, the Orlando Police Department stopped paying Officer
Realin, but he was ultimately approved for early retirement benefits by the police pension board.
Christal Hayes, Orlando Police Stops Paying Cop with PTSD After Pulse: ‘Where Is Orlando
United Now?’, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 30, 2017, 11:15 PM), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/
news/pulse-orlando-nightclub-shooting/os-gerry-realin-pulse-orlando-police-20170630-story.html;
David Harris, Pension Board Approves Early Retirement for Orlando Police Officer with PTSD
After Pulse, ORLANDO SENTINEL (July 13, 2017 (July 13, 2017, 4:40 PM),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/breaking-news/os-gerry-realin-pension-20170713-story.html.
17. FLA. STAT. § 112.1815 (2017); id. § 440.093.
18. § 112.1815.
19. Adam Tucker, How Denying Mental-Mental Claims Frustrates the Central Purposes of
Workers’ Compensation Law, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 467, 470 (2010).
20. § 112.1815(2)(a)(3).
21. Lang, supra note 15; Workers’ Compensation, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Workers’+Compensation (last visited June 21, 2016)
(describing generally what falls under the category of “indemnity benefits” in the realm of
workers’ compensation law).
22. Holfeld, supra note 1.
23. Gohl, supra note 13.
24. Id. For example, section 112.1815, as previously discussed, flatly denies
indemnification for first responder mental injury that is unaccompanied by physical injury. It
follows then, that if a committee looked to this statute for guidance in determining compensability
of an injury, it would ultimately deny coverage.
25. Robles, supra note 10 (citing how two officers described “weekslong [sic] bureaucratic
struggles” to obtain financial support as their employer attempted to “patch together resources”).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 6 [], Art. 4

1444

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

uncertainty of whether he will continue to receive financial support,
Officer Realin has resorted to creating a GoFundMe account in an effort
to elicit donations.26 Unsurprisingly, the added stress of not knowing
whether he will be able to continue supporting his family financially has
only augmented the stress and anguish caused by the shooting.27
It is estimated that more than 100,000 officers across the country
suffer from PTSD, many of whom find themselves in a similar situation
to Officer Realin.28 Currently, eighteen states, including Florida, refuse
to recognize purely psychological trauma unaccompanied by a physical
injury as a compensable injury eligible for full workers’ compensation
benefits.29 Officer Realin and his attorney are actively advocating for a
change in the current Florida workers’ compensation law that would
provide long-term disability payments if he is unable to return to his job
for an indefinite period of time.30 The brave men and women who serve
as first responders dedicate their lives to protecting others. As part of that
dedication, they risk finding themselves in traumatic circumstances that
may leave a lasting impact on them psychologically. Unfortunately, the
pain of witnessing highly traumatic events stays with these men and
women long after the last rescue has been made or the last body has been
removed.31 Recently, tragic attacks such as the Pulse shooting are
occurring with more and more frequency,32 providing more opportunities
26. Id.; Joe Startz, supra note 12.
27. Brennan, supra note 16; Robles, supra note 10 (“‘Not knowing if my kids are going to
have health insurance or [if] we’re going to get a paycheck to pay the bills, just not knowing the
financial future is a real stress,’ Officer Realin said. ‘I don’t know what’s going to happen.
Nothing is resolved.’”).
28. See Lang, supra note 15; see also Pamela Kulbarsh, 2015 Police Suicide Statistics,
OFFICER.COM (Jan. 13, 2016), http://www.officer.com/article/12156622/2015-police-suicidestatistics (estimating that roughly 15–18% of police officers, about 150,000 nationally, suffer from
post-traumatic stress). It is also believed that this figure might be less than the actual number of
law enforcement officers struggling with PTSD, due to underreporting and unwillingness to seek
help. Kulbarsh, supra.
29. Ashley R. Bailey, Stress Is [Not] Part of the Job: Finding the Appropriate Balance
Between Fairness and Efficiency to Compensate Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Under Workers’
Compensation Statutes, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 507, 518. Those states are: Alabama, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Id. at
518 n.82.
30. Kealing, supra note 11.
31. Kulbarsh, supra note 28 (citing research that indicates that as many as 1/3 of active and
retired law enforcement officers suffer from PTSD, some of whom do not even realize they suffer
from the disorder).
32. See Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Confirms a Sharp Rise in Mass Shootings Since 2000,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/25shooters.html?_r=0
(“There were, on average, 16.4 such shootings a year from 2007 to 2013, compared with an
average of 6.4 shootings annually from 2000 to 2006. In the past 13 years, 486 people have been
killed in such shootings, with 366 of the deaths in the past seven years.”); see also Tanya Basu,
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for first responder exposure to circumstances that may cause a lasting,
negative effect on their psychological well-being. The Pulse tragedy has
called attention to the increased need for Florida legislators to amend
current law and allow first responders to receive full compensation for
legitimate, purely mental injuries. Doing so honors the service of
dedicated first responders and provides them with the compensation and
financial assurance they both require and deserve.
Part I of this Note will address PTSD generally, as well as the giveand-take bargain that the workers’ compensation system embodies. Part
II describes the current posture of Florida’s workers’ compensation law,
referencing both statutes and illustrative case law to better explain how
Florida treats mental injuries. Part III demonstrates how such a
categorical denial of indemnification for first responders’ purely mental
injuries is unconstitutional, and argues that evidentiary and floodgate
concerns do not outweigh the need to compensate legitimate injury.
Lastly, Part IV proposes a model statute to be adopted by the Florida
legislature, and offers a methodology for mental injury claim evaluation
to ease whatever burden courts may feel after allowing such claims into
the courtroom.
I. BACKGROUND: PTSD GENERALLY & THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
QUID PRO QUO
To fully comprehend the gravity of Officer Realin’s mental injury,
and to understand why Florida’s legislature has been hesitant to
compensate purely mental injuries, it is helpful to have a general
understanding of post-traumatic stress disorder, commonly known as
PTSD. Additionally, it is important to note that workers’ compensation
law is entirely state specific. Each state legislature weighs pros and cons
in deciding what laws to enact and what injuries to compensate to best
serve the overarching workers’ compensation goal. A basic
understanding of this overall goal will assist with fully understanding
why that goal is frustrated by current Florida statutes.
A. PTSD Generally
While PTSD is far from new, it was officially recognized by the
American Psychiatric Association in 1980 after people took note of
Vietnam War veterans’ struggles to cope with their experiences from
battle after returning home.33 When faced with extreme sensory overload
This Chart Shows How Mass Public Shootings in the U.S. Have Risen, TIME (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://time.com/3983557/mass-shootings-america-increasing/ (depicting graphically how the
average rate of mass public shootings has risen from a 1.1 incidence rate in the 1970s to about 4.5
incidences per year between 2010 and 2013).
33. Nicholas B. Haynes, Indecisiveness in Compensating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder:
Where Does Illinois Leave First Responders?, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 151, 154 (2009).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 6 [], Art. 4

1446

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

and stress, like the stressful combat situations faced by the soldiers in
Vietnam, the human brain responds by generating what is known as the
“fight or flight” response.34 Adrenaline, cortisol, and norepinephrine
flood your brain and your heart rate increases.35 This, in turn, increases
the amount of blood pumped to extremities and muscles, elevates your
blood pressure, and provides a surge of energy that focuses your
attention, allowing you to deal with the emergency situation.36 But what
happens after the body returns to its normal state? As hormones level off
and bodily functions return to normal, you are left to process the events
you have just experienced. Most people recover from the initial
symptoms of the fight-or-flight response naturally,37 but for others
returning to a state of normalcy is not that simple. For some, exposure to
trauma such as combat, domestic violence, rape, sexual abuse, burns,
disasters, violent crime, terrorist attacks, or other significant, stressful
events can result in PTSD.38
PTSD is “a psychological reaction that occurs after experiencing a
highly stressing event . . . outside the range of normal human
experience . . . that is usually characterized by depression, anxiety,
flashbacks, recurrent nightmares, and avoidance of reminders of the
event.”39 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th
ed. (DSM-V) lists the criteria considered when making a PTSD
diagnosis.40 According to the DSM-V, the “essential feature of
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is the development of characteristic
symptoms following exposure to one or more traumatic events.”41 PTSD
can result from “[e]xposure to actual or threatened death, . . . [d]irectly
34. Stress Effects on the Body, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N (2016), http://www.apa.org/
helpcenter/stress-body.aspx.
35. Sarah Klein, Adrenaline, Cortisol, Norepinephrine: The Three Major Stress Hormones,
Explained, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 19, 2013, 8:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2013/04/19/adrenaline-cortisol-stress-hormones_n_3112800.html (explaining what each of these
stress hormones are, where they are produced from, and what effect each of them has on the
human body).
36. Id.; AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, supra note 34.
37. Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH (Feb. 2016),
https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/post-traumatic-stress-disorder-ptsd/index.shtml.
38. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and
Admissibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 10 (2001);
see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
271–80 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V], https://psicovalero.files.wordpress.com/2014/06/
dsm-v-manual-diagnc3b3stico-y-estadc3adstico-de-los-trastornos-mentales.pdf (describing the
diagnostic criteria used in diagnosing PTSD, the stressors known to cause PTSD, diagnostic
features of the disorder, prevalence, and risks associated with the disorder).
39. Post-traumatic Stress Disorder, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/post-traumatic%20stress%20disorder (last visited May 17, 2017).
40. DSM-V, supra note 38, at 271–72.
41. Id. at 274.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss6/4

8

Foels: Rescuing the Rescuer: Reforming How Florida’s Workers’ Compensati

2017]

RESCUING THE RESCUER

1447

experiencing [a] traumatic event(s) . . . [or] [e]xperiencing repeated or
extreme exposure to aversive details of the traumatic event(s).”42 The
DSM-V even cites as an example of a traumatic event “first responders
collecting human remains.”43 Additionally, the other criteria necessary
for a PTSD diagnosis include (1) the presence of one or more “intrusion
symptoms” associated with the causative event;44 (2) “[d]issociative
reactions” or flashbacks; (3) “[p]ersistent avoidance of stimuli associated
with the event”; (4) negative alterations in mood; (5) “alterations in
arousal and reactivity” associated with the event (such as “[i]rritable
behavior and angry outbursts,” “[h]ypervigilence,” or “[s]leep
disturbance”); (6) the duration of the aforementioned criteria lasting
longer than one month; and the requirement that (7) the symptoms cause
“significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning.”45
Symptoms of PTSD can include re-experiencing the trauma, avoiding
situations or activities reminiscent of the original trauma, hypervigilance,
and health problems such as hypertension.46 Essentially, an individual
with PTSD suffers from a persistent re-experiencing of the traumatic
event; “[e]very time the traumatic event is recollected, it triggers a
physiological arousal and stress response, intense fear, and anxiety of the
event.”47 PTSD victims can spend their lives running from triggers that
cause them to slip back into the painful memory of the traumatic event.
“A color, a light, a sound, a word, almost anything can trigger a reminder
of that feared incident, causing the same response every time, reliving the
entire event” from memory.48 The fear, pain, helplessness, and all of the
physical reactions that accompanied the initial event, are all reexperienced.49 Fortunately, since 1980 PTSD has become more widely
recognized and understood by our society, and the number of individuals
who have been successfully diagnosed and treated for PTSD continues to
increase every year.50
42. Id. at 271.
43. Id.
44. Id. Intrusion symptoms are further defined to include “recurrent, involuntary, and
intrusive distressing memories” of the traumatic event; “recurrent distressing dreams” related to
the event; flashbacks in which the individual feels or acts as though the event is recurring; and
intense psychological distress when exposed to “cues” that symbolize the event. Id.
45. Id. at 271–72.
46. Id. at 272, 275; Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 14, 16.
47. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 16–17.
48. Id. at 17. For Officer Realin, some of those triggers include Sharpies, face masks, and
San Francisco 49ers jerseys; “Sharpies because of the markers the authorities used to put the
names of the victims on a board. Masks for the one he wore that day to keep blood off his face.
Forty-nine for the number of people who were killed.” Robles, supra note 10.
49. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 17.
50. Haynes, supra note 33, at 154 (noting that one of the reasons PTSD has become more
prevalent in recent years is due to the number of soldiers returning from Iraq who suffer from
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B. Workers’ Compensation Purpose and the Quid Pro Quo
Workers’ compensation law functions in a unique fashion. Since its
genesis, it has been legislated with no federal involvement and is
therefore the product of absolute state authority.51 States possess the right
to decide the framework and standards they believe best benefit their
citizens and what injuries they believe should be compensable under
those standards.52 The driving philosophy behind workers’ compensation
law is “belief in the wisdom of providing, in the most efficient, most
dignified, and most certain form, financial and medical benefits for the
victims of work-connected injuries.”53 By design, the workers’
compensation system functions as a type of quid pro quo: it is a “nofault”54 system where employers are shielded from excessive liability by
predetermined sums to be paid when an employee files a claim for a
work-related injury.55 In exchange for employer limited liability, the
employee is guaranteed some (typically modest) compensation for
waiving their right to pursue the action in civil court, and benefits from a
streamlined system well accustomed to handling workers’ compensation
claims.56
In Florida, the legislative intent of workers’ compensation law is
codified in Florida Statutes section 440.015. The statute states that the
PTSD symptoms); PTSD Statistics, PTSD UNITED, http://www.ptsdunited.org/ptsd-statistics-2/
(last visited June 21, 2017) (“In the past year alone the number of diagnosed cases in the military
jumped 50%.”); see generally Jaimie L. Gradus, Epidemiology of PTSD, U.S. DEP’T OF
VETERAN’S AFF., http://www.ptsd.va.gov/professional/PTSD-overview/epidemiological-factsptsd.asp (last visited May 17, 2017) (describing studies conducted to evaluate the prevalence of
PTSD in men, women, adolescents, and other members of the community).
51. Logan Burke, Note, Finding a Way Out of No Man’s Land: Compensating MentalMental Claims and Bringing West Virginia’s Workers’ Compensation System into the 21st
Century, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 889, 890 (2015).
52. Tucker, supra note 19, at 468.
53. Bailey, supra note 29, at 513 (quoting 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON’S WORKERS’
COMPENSATION LAW § 1.03 (Matthew Bender ed.)). German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who
passed the first compensation law in 1884, believed a system where employees agree not to sue
when they are injured and employers agree to pay medical bills and lost wages would serve could
be a way to humanize the industrial revolution. Ash, supra note 8; Burke, supra note 51, at 891.
54. Workers’ compensation is a no-fault system because “negligence and fault are largely
immaterial, both in the sense that the employee’s contributory negligence does not lessen his or
her rights and in the sense that the employer’s complete freedom from fault does not lessen its
liability.” Bailey, supra note 29, at 513; see also LARSON, supra note 53, § 1.02 (“[T]he right to
benefits and amount of benefits are based largely on a social theory of providing support and
preventing destitution, rather than settling accounts between two individuals according to their
personal deserts or blame.”).
55. Burke, supra note 51, at 895.
56. Id. at 890–91; LARSON, supra note 53, § 1.01 (stating that the injured employee is
“automatically entitled to certain benefits whenever the employee suffers a ‘personal injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment,’” and in exchange, “give[s] up [his or
her] common-law right to sue the employer for damages for any injury covered by the act”).
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assurance of “quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical
benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate the worker’s return to
gainful employment” is the primary goal of workers’ compensation law.57
Additionally, “[i]t is the specific intent of the Legislature that workers’
compensation cases shall be decided on their merits.”58 Furthermore,
Florida Statutes section 440.11 codifies the exclusive liability provision,
stating that “[t]he liability of an employer prescribed in [the workers’
compensation statutes] shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liability.”59 In light of these statutes, it is certainly curious how a blanket
denial of workers’ compensation indemnity benefits for first responders
with PTSD or other purely mental injuries furthers these explicitly stated
legislative intentions.
Workers’ compensation functions like a contractual agreement
between employer and employee, with both sides making concessions to
avoid the cost and unpredictability that inevitably accompanies civil tort
claims.60 However, for this system to work, the employee must have
adequate compensation for her injury. If she does not, what benefit does
she gain from the agreement? For first responders who sustain physical
injury in Florida, the compromise is arguably fair. Physically injured
employees benefit from the no-fault system and are typically provided
with full compensation for legitimate claims.61 Employees with purely
mental injuries, however, do not receive the same consideration, and are
effectively left in limbo. First responders who sustain purely mental
injury have essentially signed away their right to pursue full
compensation for their injury in civil court. Without the provision of
indemnification through the avenue of workers’ compensation
reimbursement, those injured first responders are left without recourse.
II. FLORIDA’S CURRENT WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAW
The Florida Statutes that govern the delivery of workers’
compensation benefits for a typical injured employee completely bar
claims for purely mental injury.62 However, several years ago an
exception was created for first responders, allowing firefighters,
57. FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (2017).
58. Id. (emphasis added).
59. Id. § 440.11. For a general discussion about the “Exclusiveness Rule” of workers’
compensation, see 9 LARSON, supra note 53, § 100.01.
60. As Logan Burke points out, the agreement stricken by employer and employee is
paradoxical. Both sides make themselves more vulnerable while simultaneously better
safeguarding themselves from financial injury. Employees benefit from guaranteed payments, yet
give up the right to sue in tort in exchange. Employers promise to provide employees with certain
benefits irrespective of employer fault, and in exchange are insulated from the possibility of
excessive tort judgments. Burke, supra note 51, at 892.
61. § 440.093; id. § 112.1815.
62. § 440.093(1).
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paramedics, EMTs, and law enforcement officers to bring claims for
mental injury unaccompanied by any sort of physical injury.63
Confoundingly, the legislature stopped short of providing full coverage.
Despite recognizing that first responder mental injuries can and do exist,
the legislature decided to limit recovery to only medical benefits,
explicitly excluding the provision of indemnification.64 During the 2017
legislative session, a handful of bills were proposed in both the Florida
House and Senate that, if passed, would amend or replace current law and
provide both medical and indemnity benefits to first responders.65
However, the bills failed to progress through the requisite legislative
subcommittees in time, and died when the 2017 session ended.66 In
analyzing the issues created by the distinction between types of mental
injury and provision of some benefits but not others, a brief review of the
current Florida Statutes and illustrative case law is helpful. In addition, it
is important to note that although such laws distinguish between
employees with different injuries and limitations, there is no direct
conflict with the Americans with Disabilities Act.67
A. Florida’s Mental or Nervous Disorders and First
Responder Statutes
Florida Statutes sections 440.093 and 112.1815 describe the
prerequisites for claiming a compensable mental injury. Section 440.093
states that “a mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement
only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment” and “[a]
physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied
by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be compensable
under this chapter.”68 Additionally, the mental or nervous injury must be
63. Harper Gerlach PL, Florida Lawmakers Broaden Workers’ Comp. Coverage for ‘First
Responders,’ 19 NO. 8 FLA. EMP. L. LETTER 1 (2007).
64. Id. (“[T]he first responder may receive medical benefits (but not indemnity
benefits) . . . [and] may receive indemnity benefits [only] if a compensable physical injury
accompanies the mental or nervous injury.”); see § 112.1815(3) (excluding indemnification unless
a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies the mental or nervous
injury). It is unclear why the legislature chose to explicitly deny indemnity. The distinction seems
arbitrarily drawn as providing first responders with medical benefits for proven, legitimate mental
injury claims validates such injuries and shows they should be given credence. If medical benefits
are provided, the employee has already demonstrated the manifestation of an injury by clear and
convincing evidence, the standard used to verify compensable injuries. Id.
65. S. 516, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017); H.R. 1019; 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla.
2017); S. 1088, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017).
66. S. 516, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017); H.R. 1019; 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla.
2017); S. 1088, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017).
67. The ADA is codified in the United States Code, beginning at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012);
Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724, 726–27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). See infra Section II.D for
ADA preemption discussion.
68. § 440.093(1).
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demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence and “[t]he compensable
physical injury must be and remain the major contributing cause of the
mental or nervous condition.”69
In 2007, Governor Charlie Crist signed a bill that broadened the
compensation coverage available to first responders,70 now codified in
Florida Statutes section 112.1815. The statute defines “first responder”
as “a law enforcement officer, . . . a firefighter, . . . an emergency medical
technician [EMT] or paramedic . . . employed by state or local
government” and does allow for some compensation, such as medical
benefits, for strictly mental injury.71 However, the statute explicitly states
that “[f]or a mental or nervous injury arising out of the employment
unaccompanied by a physical injury . . . only medical benefits . . . shall
be payable,” and that “payment of indemnity . . . may not be made unless
a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies
the mental or nervous injury.”72 Indemnity benefits help compensate an
employee for his loss of income and earning capacity,73 and in some
circumstances are crucial to an employee who is unable to return to work
for a prolonged or undetermined period of time. Without such benefits,
the employee may find himself with no viable source of income,74 and
like Officer Realin, may face uncertainty as to how he will continue to
support his family financially.
B. Illustrative Case Law: McKenzie v. Mental Health Care
The Florida First District Court of Appeal discussed Section 440.093
at length in McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc.75 In McKenzie, a
registered nurse working in a treatment center that housed patients with
behavioral and mental disorders was struck in the throat by a violent
patient, resulting in physical injury.76 In addition, the nurse claimed she
sustained psychological injury as a result of the attack, but her employer
denied workers’ compensation for this claim.77 The McKenzie court
stated that the purpose of workers’ compensation law is to provide
69. Id. § 440.093(2).
70. Harper Gerlach PL, supra note 63, at 1.
71. § 112.1815.
72. Id. § 112.1815(2)(a)(3) (emphasis added).
73. Workers’ Compensation, THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://legal-dictionary.thefree
dictionary.com/Workers’+Compensation (last visited June 21, 2016).
74. Christopher J. Boggs, Benefits Provided Under Workers’ Compensation Laws, INS. J.
(Mar.
23,
2015),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/academy-journal/2015/03/23/
360655.htm (describing how injured employees may be completely unable to work and garner the
same pay as they could prior to their injury, resulting in either a complete loss of income or a
considerably diminished lifestyle).
75. 43 So. 3d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
76. Id. at 768.
77. Id.
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defined benefits for certain injuries caused by workplace accidents.78 The
court continued to describe situations in which mental or nervous injuries
might occur.79 Notably, the court recognized that the second sentence of
section 440.093(1) recognizes and makes compensable “mental or
nervous injuries that accompany a separate physical injury serious
enough to require medical treatment.”80 The court believed it was
particularly important to recognize that the workplace accident at issue in
this case caused two separate injuries, one physical and one mental.81
Another example of such contemporaneous injuries might be if an
employee was sexually assaulted or battered at work, resulting in both a
compensable physical injury and an accompanying mental injury.
According to the court in McKenzie, in such a situation the employee
“simultaneously suffered two compensable workplace injuries.”82 The
court contrasted this scenario with circumstances giving rise to a purely
psychological injury, such as an employee being robbed at gunpoint or
witnessing a horrific event in the workplace.83 Although the legislature
recognizes that such mental injuries can occur and do exist, they are
nonetheless not compensable under the current statutory scheme.84
C. Types of Mental Injury
As the court in McKenzie noted, there are several different types of
mental injuries considered by the legislature. The court discussed four
types of injury, two of which are compensable and two of which are not.85
These different injury scenarios can further be broken down into the three
sub-categories of (1) physical–mental injury, (2) mental–physical injury,
and (3) mental–mental injury.86
78. Id. at 769.
79. Id. at 769–70.
80. Id. at 769.
81. Id.
82. Id. The court in McKenzie appeared to be comfortable with recognizing and
compensating the accompanying mental injury because the injury met the requirements of
sections 440.09 and 440.093 of the Florida Statutes. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1) (2017) (requiring that
the injury arise out of work performed in the course and scope of employment; that the injury be
“established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical
findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any
resulting injuries”); id. § 440.093(2) (requiring that claimants demonstrate injury by clear and
convincing evidence “by a licensed psychiatrist meeting criteria established in the most recent
edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders published by the American
Psychiatric Association”; and that the injury “remain[s] the major contributing cause of the mental
or nervous condition and the compensable physical injury . . . be at least 50 percent responsible
for the mental or nervous condition”).
83. McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 769.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 769–70.
86. Burke, supra note 51, at 896.
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A physical–mental injury occurs when an employee suffers a physical
injury that causes some psychological response in the employee, resulting
in an accompanying mental injury subsequent to or concurrent with the
physical injury.87 Examples of this might include an employee who
suffers a painful burn or loss of limb on the job, and over time the
employee becomes clinically depressed, develops PTSD, severe anxiety,
or some other adverse mental response resulting from the earlier physical
injury.88 Pursuant to subsection 440.093(2) and the second sentence of
subsection 440.093(1), the psychological injury that manifests is
compensable as long as the underlying physical injury is proven to be the
“major contributing cause” of the mental injury, or the psychological
injury is deemed to have occurred simultaneously with the physical
injury.89 These types of claims are generally compensable because the
employee has suffered a “distinct, objective physical and traumatic injury
during the course of his employment.”90
Mental–physical classification, on the other hand, encompasses
physical injuries that result from mental or nervous injury that are
unaccompanied by a clear causative physical trauma.91 As the third
sentence of subsection 440.093(1) dictates, employees injured under this
scenario do not receive compensation.92 An example of this situation
might be where an employee suffers a heart attack or develops high blood
pressure due to constant and prolonged workplace pressures. Because the
physical injury claimed manifested as a result of mental injury, it is not
compensable under Florida law. Despite the objective nature of the
resulting physical injury, courts and legislators are concerned about the
difficulty of proving that the injury was actually caused by the workplace
stimuli.93
Lastly, mental–mental injury claims, like the injury claimed by
Officer Realin, do not have an underlying causative physical
component.94 This type of injury is addressed by the first sentence of
87. Id.
88. Burke offers the example of an oil rig worker who is badly burned in a rig fire. The
worker’s physical injuries ultimately heal, but the worker develops a paralyzing fear that another
fire will inevitably occur, further disabling his ability to perform his job. Id.
89. FLA. STAT. § 440.093(1)–(2) (2017); McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 770.
90. Burke, supra note 51, at 896.
91. Id.; McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 769–70.
92. Id.; § 440.093(1).
93. Burke, supra note 51, at 896. Despite the objective, physical response, legislators fear
the burden that accompanies proving what caused injuries of this kind. Using the heart attack
example, a loud, abrupt noise might induce extreme fright and cause someone to suffer a heart
attack; however, certain individuals are more susceptible to suffering heart attacks than others. Id.
at 896–97. In such a circumstance, it cannot clearly be concluded that the major contributing cause
of the heart attack was the noise, and not the predisposition to heart attacks. Id.
94. Id. at 897. PTSD and other mental–mental injuries oftentimes manifest themselves in
physical symptoms such as hypertension and other cardiac issues such as coronary heart disease.
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section 440.093(1), which states that mental or nervous injuries “due to
stress, fright, or excitement only,” are not considered a compensable
injury deemed to have arisen out of the course of employment.95 Like the
robbery example provided by the court in McKenzie,96 Officer Realin
sustained no subsequent or contemporaneous physical injury while
removing the bodies from the nightclub.97 As such, his mental injury is
not recognized as a compensable injury by Florida statutes. Legislatures
justify their denial of compensation citing concerns about establishing
causation, proof of injury, and degree of impairment.98
McKenzie is helpful in understanding how Florida courts and
legislators view what injuries are compensable and how they distinguish
between types of mental injury. In Officer Realin’s case, because he
suffered no physical injury while removing the bodies, he would have
fallen under the purview of subsection 440.093(1), and absent the
additional first responder statute he would not be entitled to any
compensation benefits at all. This distinction between what benefits are
awarded based on what type of mental injury is sustained is important,
because despite the fact that Officer Realin is now entitled to ongoing
medical compensation per the first responder statute, section 112.1815
still distinguishes between physical–mental and mental–mental injuries.
First responders claiming purely mental injury enjoy only limited rights,
while claimants who suffered an underlying physical injury are greenlighted to receive full compensation, including rights to indemnification.
If Officer Realin had tripped and broken his leg while removing the
bodies, he would have a stronger claim to full compensation.
D. Non-ADA Preemption
The First District has found no direct conflict between the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA)99 and Florida’s workers’ compensation

Steven S. Coughlin, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder and Cardiovascular Disease, 5 OPEN
CARDIOVASCULAR MED. J. 164, 164 (2011). However, because such injuries lack an underlying
physical injury that gave rise to the mental injury itself, it remains uncompensated by the Florida
legislature. § 440.093(1).
95. § 440.093(1).
96. McKenzie, 43 So. 3d at 769 (“[A]n employee experiences mental trauma after being
robbed at gunpoint but does not suffer a physical injury requiring medical treatment.”).
97. See supra INTRODUCTION.
98. Burke, supra note 51, at 897. It is thought that these evidentiary hurdles are
compounded by the lack of unanimity between medicine and psychiatry, including differing
methods of evaluation for mental–mental injuries. Id. But see id. (“[P]sychiatric injuries are better
understood than ever before, an understanding that should be extended to the workers’
compensation framework within a changing workplace.”).
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
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statutes that classify purely mental injuries as non-compensable.100 In
coming to this conclusion, the court in Hensley v. Punta Gorda101
reasoned that the Florida workers’ compensation statutes were crafted to
“assure the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits
to an injured worker and to facilitate the workers’ return to gainful
reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer.”102 Conversely, the
ADA is intended “to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate
for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities”
and “to prevent the prejudicial treatment of disabled persons and to allow
such persons to compete in the workplace.”103 The two bodies of law
were therefore created with different intents and to satisfy two distinct
goals. While Florida workers’ compensation statutes address the needs of
disabled individuals incapable of returning to their former employment,
the ADA does not aim to guarantee equal rights to benefits for all disabled
individuals.104 Workers’ compensation statutes denying compensation to
individuals who suffered purely mental injuries are not preempted
because the ADA does not mandate that all disabled persons must receive
equal benefits, “regardless of their varying abilities to work.”105 As long
as there are no unreasonable or unnecessary barriers to a disabled
person’s right to work, under the ADA an employer is under no legal duty
to provide equal benefits for employees who have suffered different
forms of mental injury.106 The ADA therefore cannot be utilized to
remedy the injustices created by the current Florida workers’
compensation statutory scheme. Instead, constitutional challenges to the
statutes from due process and access to the courts standpoints must be the
vehicles used to effectuate change.
100. Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724, 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (“Although
entitlement to Florida workers’ compensation benefits is subject to the anti-discrimination
provisions of the ADA, it does not follow that the ADA necessarily preempts Florida workers’
compensation laws.”).
101. Id. at 724.
102. Id. at 727 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.015 (Supp. 1994)).
103. Id.; see also Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62
FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1121–22 (2010) (describing the general accommodation requirements of
employers under the ADA and characterizing the ADA as the “emancipation proclamation for
people with disabilities”).
104. Hensley, 686 So. 2d at 727. The ADA prohibits employers from “‘discriminat[ing]
against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard
to’ hiring, discharge, and other terms and conditions of employment.” Kelly Cahill Timmons,
Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 190
(2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)). The ADA only protects “qualified” individuals
from discrimination by employers. Id. at 190–91 (defining “qualified individual” as someone who
“with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires”).
105. Hensley, 686 So. 2d at 727.
106. Id. at 728.
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS
Both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions guarantee all natural persons
certain inalienable basic rights, among which are the rights to enjoy and
defend life and liberty, pursue happiness, and to acquire, possess, and
protect property.107 According to the Florida Constitution, if a citizen is
deprived of life, liberty, or property for a sufficient reason, they are
guaranteed due process of law, and shall have full access to the courts for
redress of any injury.108 Keeping in mind the quid pro quo created by the
workers’ compensation system, it is helpful to analyze how the Florida
Supreme Court has balanced these constitutional rights with the
reciprocity agreement between employer and employee.109 This Part will
analyze the constitutionality of Florida’s first responder workers’
compensation statute, both from due process and access to the courts
standpoints. Ultimately, this Part argues that an indefinite, categorical
denial of full coverage for all first responders who suffer mental–mental
injury violates both U.S. and Florida constitutional guarantees.
A. Due Process: The Castellanos v. Next Door Co. Standard
To successfully bring a due process challenge, it must first be
established that the claimant has a legitimate property interest the
claimant desires to protect.110 In Rucker v. City of Ocala,111 the Florida
Supreme Court found that an injured employee’s right to receive workers’
compensation benefits qualifies as such an interest.112 Florida courts have
never considered a due process challenge to first responder indemnity
benefits for PTSD. However, the Florida Supreme Court recently
addressed a due process challenge to a different section of the current
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
108. FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 21. While not stated expressly, as in the Florida Constitution,
the right of access to courts is also implicit in the U.S. Constitution. See Judith Anne Bass, Article
I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 871, 871 (1977) (“The right of
access to the courts was such an integral part of the common law that the framers of our Federal
Constitution perceived no need to guarantee this right expressly. Though not specifically provided
for, the right of court access is nevertheless pervasive within the United States Constitution.”).
Over the years, courts have found a federal constitutional guarantee of access to courts in: the
First Amendment’s petition for redress of grievances clause, the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments’ due process clauses, the Sixth Amendment’s right to speedy and public trial
guarantee, the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clause. Id. at 871–72.
109. See supra Section I.B.
110. Rucker v. City of Ocala, 684 So. 2d 836, 840 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (“Procedural due
process rights derive from a property interest in which the individual has a legitimate claim.”).
111. Id. at 836.
112. Id. at 840; see also De Ayala v. Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins., 543 So. 2d 204, 206 n.6
(Fla. 1989) (“[I]n the sense that the worker’s compensation system replaced other rights formerly
afforded to workers, we cannot agree . . . that worker’s compensation is entirely in the nature of
a privilege.”).
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workers’ compensation code. In Castellanos v. Next Door Co.,113 the
Florida Supreme Court was asked to evaluate the constitutionality of the
mandatory fee schedule dictated by Florida Statutes section 440.34.114
The statute created an irrebuttable presumption that precluded any
consideration or questioning of whether a fee award was reasonable to
compensate a workers’ compensation attorney.115 Despite the obvious
unreasonableness of the statutorily determined rate to be paid to
Castellanos’s attorney,116 the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) and
the First District were barred from reviewing the fee award for
reasonableness.117 The fee schedule statute simply “presumes that the
ultimate fee will always be reasonable . . . without providing any
mechanism for refutation.”118 The Florida Supreme Court found that such
preclusion of any inquiry into reasonableness was unconstitutional under
both the Florida and U.S. Constitutions as a violation of due process.119
As part of their analysis, the court set forth a three-part test used to
determine the constitutionality of a statute’s conclusive presumption.120
The court must inquire into
(1) whether the concern of the Legislature was ‘reasonably
aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legitimately
desired to avoid’; (2) whether there was a ‘reasonable basis
for a conclusion that the statute would protect against its
occurrence’; and (3) whether ‘the expense and other
difficulties of individual determinations justify the inherent
imprecision of a conclusive presumption.’121
For an irrebuttable presumption to pass a constitutional due process
challenge, each prong of the test must be satisfied.122

113. 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016).
114. FLA. STAT. § 440.34 (2016); Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 432.
115. Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 432.
116. Because section 440.34 uses a sliding scale to limit a claimant’s ability to recover fees
based on the amount of benefits obtained, regardless of the amount of time and energy actually
expended, the fee awarded to Castellanos’s attorney amounted to $1.53 per hour for 107.2 hours
of work. Id. at 433.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 432, 435 (holding that the statute violated both article I, section 9 of the Florida
Constitution and Amendment XIV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution).
120. Id. at 444.
121. Id. (quoting Recchi Am., Inc. v. Hall, 692 So. 2d 153, 154 (Fla. 1997)).
122. Id. (noting that the challenged presumption in Recchi failed because the expense and
other difficulties of individual determinations failed to justify the imprecision of the presumption,
thus failing the test by not satisfying prong (3)).
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It is instructive to focus on the court’s analysis of the first and third
prongs.123 Applying those prongs to the situation of first responders
provides a compelling argument that the first responder statute’s
irrebuttable presumption against indemnification for mental–mental
injury should be found unconstitutional. In Castellanos, the court
concluded that the fee schedule statute failed the first prong of the test,
reasoning that while the fee schedule’s conclusive presumption achieves
the legislative goal of avoiding excessive attorney’s fees by mandating
fee standardization, “it does so in a manner that lacks any relationship to
the amount of time and effort actually expended by the attorney.”124
Additionally, the court found that a concern about excessive fee awards
is insufficient, as other safeguards are already in place to guard against
the risk of excessive fees.125 The court concluded that the statute would
also fail the third prong of the test because judges of compensation claims
are skilled in determining, awarding, and approving fees without undue
expense or difficulty, and have done so since the advent of the workers’
compensation system.126 Despite the proven efficiency of the courts, the
fee schedule prevents injured workers from presenting evidence to prove
unreasonable inadequacy of a fee in their specific case.127 The court found
that without the ability of the judiciary to assess reasonableness on a caseby-case basis and deviate from the statutory mandate when necessary,
there remains the risk that the result will be “arbitrary, unjust, and grossly
inadequate.”128
B. Access to Courts: The Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg Standard
Another recent Florida Supreme Court case, Westphal v. City of St.
Petersburg,129 considered the constitutionality of a workers’
compensation statute that cut off disability benefits after a predetermined
123. The second prong—“whether there was a ‘reasonable basis for a conclusion that the
statute would protect against’” abuse the legislature desired to avoid—has little applicability here.
Id. Clearly an absolute bar of indemnification claims for first responder mental–mental injury
could reasonably be concluded to protect against evidentiary and floodgate concerns. The focus
of this analysis is on the reasonableness of those legislative concerns themselves, not on the
reasonableness of the means to protect against them.
124. Id.
125. Id. (citing a rule regulating the Florida Bar, 4–1.5, as an example, which provides a
number of factors to consider when determining a reasonable fee).
126. Id. at 446. A similar rationale was used in deciding Recchi, where the court held that a
statute withholding from an employee the opportunity to rebut the presumption that intoxication
or influence of drugs was a contributing cause of his or her workplace injury was held to violate
due process. 692 So. 2d at 154. The presumption ultimately failed the third prong of the test
because the relatively low expense and minor difficulties of individual determinations did not
justify the inherent imprecision of the conclusive presumption. Id.
127. Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 448.
128. Id.
129. 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss6/4

20

Foels: Rescuing the Rescuer: Reforming How Florida’s Workers’ Compensati

2017]

RESCUING THE RESCUER

1459

period of time for workers who are totally disabled and incapable of
working, but who have not yet reached maximum medical
improvement.130 The Court found that the statute was unconstitutional
under Article I, Section 21 of the Florida Constitution, the guarantee of
the right of access to courts.131 In so finding, the court reasoned that the
statute “deprive[d] an injured worker of disability benefits . . . for an
indefinite amount of time . . . creating a system of redress that no longer
function[ed] as a reasonable alternative to tort litigation.”132
The court articulated that the statute frustrated the stated purpose of
workers’ compensation law133 because it cut off the benefits provided to
an injured worker at a critical time—when the employee cannot return to
work but the employee’s doctors believe that the employee’s condition
may still continue to improve.134 The “constitutional yardstick” applied
by the court to determine whether an access-to-the-courts violation has
occurred, was “whether the [statutory] scheme continues to provide
‘adequate, sufficient, and . . . preferable safeguards for an employee who
is injured on the job.’”135 Additionally, the court harped on the
importance of the right of access to courts, noting that the right has
typically been construed liberally to guarantee accessibility to courts for
injured employees to resolve disputes.136 The court continued that:
[T]he Legislature is without power to abolish such a right
without providing a reasonable alternative to protect the
rights of the people of the State to redress for injuries, unless
the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity
for the abolishment of such a right, and no alternative
method of meeting such public necessity can be shown.137
Although workers’ compensation abolished the right to sue an employer
130. Id. at 313 (referencing FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2)(a) (2016)).
131. Id. at 327.
132. Id. at 313.
133. § 440.015 (articulating that the purpose of workers’ compensation law is “to assure the
quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker and to facilitate
the worker’s return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer”); Westphal,
194 So. 3d at 314 (“[T]he workers’ compensation law undoubtedly fails to provide ‘full medical
care and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability regardless of fault.’”). For further
general discussion of the historical driving force behind workers’ compensation law, see supra
Section I.B.
134. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 314.
135. Id. at 315 (quoting Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973)).
136. Id. at 321 (citing the language of article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution that
guarantees every person access to the courts and ensures the administration of justice without
denial or delay); Psychiatric Assocs. v. Siegel, 610 So. 2d 419, 424 (Fla. 1992) (stating that “[t]he
right to go to court to resolve our disputes” is a fundamental right), receded from on other grounds,
Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1996).
137. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322 (quoting Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4) (emphasis added).
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in tort for job-related injuries, it “provide[s] adequate, sufficient, and
even preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured on the job,
thus satisfying one of the exceptions to the rule against abolition of the
right to redress for an injury.”138
Workers’ compensation constitutes a “reasonable alternative” to suing
in tort, and does not violate the constitutional guarantee of access to
courts, only “so long as it provides adequate and sufficient safeguards for
the injured employee.”139 For a workers’ compensation law to be upheld
as constitutional, it must continue to provide a reasonable alternative to
tort litigation, keeping in mind the original intent of the workers’
compensation scheme.140 The proverbial “tipping point” where a statute
crosses the line into unconstitutionality is when it effectively constitutes
a denial of benefits for a legitimately injured employee.141 While in
Westphal the court considered the constitutional challenge of a statute
that completely denied benefits to a disabled worker,142 the first
responder statute’s denial of indemnity is no less serious, as it denies
hardworking first responders the critical economic support necessary to
pay their bills and survive on a day-to-day basis.

138. Id. at 322 (emphasis omitted). When the Florida Workers’ Compensation Act (FWCA)
was first enacted, the statutory scheme was thought to be a favorable substitute for tort litigation,
as it diminished the uncertainty that inevitably accompanies tort litigation, benefitting both
employer and employee. Viktoryia Johnson, Florida Workers’ Compensation Act: The
Unconstitutional Erosion of the Quid Pro Quo, 45 STETSON L. REV. 119, 143 (2015) (“Florida’s
[workers’] compensation program was established . . . to replace an unwieldy tort system that
made it virtually impossible for businesses to predict or insure for the cost of industrial
accidents.”). But see id. at 119, 144 (suggesting that, while the original workers’ compensation
scheme enacted by the Florida legislature in 1935 may have served as an adequate substitute for
tort, over time the statute’s modality has been significantly eroded and in its present state it is no
longer sufficient to substitute for the access to courts guarantee).
139. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322; Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 4.
140. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322–23 (“[T]o provide ‘injured workers with full medical care
and wage-loss payments for total or partial disability regardless or fault and without the delay and
uncertainty of tort litigation.’”).
141. Id. at 323 (describing this “tipping point” as the point where the diminution of benefits
effectively constitutes a denial of benefits).
142. The court contrasted the situation in Westphal with Martinez v. Scanlan, an earlier
decision in which a statute that reduced the workers’ compensation benefits a claimant would
receive was upheld as constitutional. Compare 194 So. 3d at 322–23, with 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla.
1991). While the current first responder situation does not deal with a full denial of benefits,
Martinez can be contrasted, as the court held that such a reduction in benefits still constitutes a
reasonable alternative to tort litigation because it continues to provide injured workers with full
medical care and wage-loss payments. Compare 194 So. 3d at 322–23, with 582 So. 2d at 1171–
72.
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C. Dispelling Legislative Concerns
From both Castellanos and Westphal a workable standard can be
deduced and applied to the current first responder circumstance.143 The
constitutional standards used in both cases exhibit a common and
controlling denominator: whether a reasonable legislative concern
overcomes the public necessity for a statutory irrebuttable
presumption.144 To clearly and appropriately apply these standards to the
first responder circumstance, one must first address and abate the
legislative concerns that weigh in favor of the current conclusive
presumption against fully compensating mental–mental injuries of first
responders. Doing so will show that the concerns are largely overblown,
and prove that such a presumption frustrates the purpose of workers’
compensation law by unreasonably and unconstitutionally denying full
compensation for first responders.
When state legislatures consider what injuries should be compensable
under workers’ compensation statutes, two concerns dominate the
conversation. First, legislators are concerned about malingering,145 and
that allowing mental–mental claims will lead to other evidentiary
difficulties in proving that the mental injuries were actually caused by
workplace stimuli.146 Second, legislators are concerned that allowing
mental–mental claims will cause an expensive increase in the amount of
workers’ compensation claims; an opening of the proverbial “floodgates”
that will have a negative fiscal impact on employers, administrative
agencies, and society as a whole.147

143. See infra Section III.D for the application of the Castellanos and Westphal standards to
the first responder circumstance.
144. In Castellanos, this concern is exemplified in the first prong of the court’s test: whether
the concern of the Legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse it legitimately
desired to avoid. 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (2016). In Westphal, that concern is reflected in the court’s
articulation that, unless the Legislature can show an overpowering public necessity for the
abolishment of an individual’s rights, the legislature is without power to abolish those rights. 194
So. 3d at 322.
145. Malinger, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malinger
(last visited June 21, 2017) (defining malingering as “pretend[ing] or exaggerate[ing] incapacity
or illness (as to avoid duty or work)”).
146. Tucker, supra note 19, at 477.
147. Id. at 481; see also PROFESSIONAL STAFF ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT,
FLA. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING & INS. 2, 10–13 (2007) [hereinafter PROFESSIONAL STAFF
ANALYSIS], http://archive.flsenate.gov/data/session/2007/Senate/bills/analysis/pdf/ 2007s0746.bi.pdf
(discussing generally the fiscal implications of SB 746, including the additional costs expected
for individual self-insurers, after section 112.1815, Florida Statutes, goes into effect).
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1. Evidentiary Concerns
Because mental injuries and disorders such as PTSD develop through
“‘complex interrelation’ between one’s ‘internal, subjective reality’ and
[one’s] ‘external, environmental reality,’” those in favor of barring their
compensability argue that the evidentiary burden of proving or
disproving purely mental claims will be too immense.148 Due to this
complexity, legislators fear that these types of injuries will be more
difficult to evaluate and may therefore be easier to falsify. 149 Fear of
fraudulently brought claims, or malingering,150 has greatly influenced
legislators’ and judiciaries’ attitudes regarding whether or not these
claims can and should be compensable.151
Fears of malingering and causation uncertainty, while once potentially
legitimate concerns, have largely been quelled by scientific
breakthroughs and increased understanding of mental health disorders.152
In fact, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-IV) provides a list of factors to use to detect malingering,153
available to any clinician or expert. There is even an entire subfield of
forensic psychology that centers around the detection of malingering.154
Additionally, PTSD has been empirically tested and subjected to critique
148. Tucker, supra note 19, at 477.
149. Bailey, supra note 29, at 514; see also Tucker, supra note 19, at 477 (addressing the
concerns about determining the true cause of a mental disorder, such as the challenges of
determining which external, environmental factors is the primary cause of the disorder).
150. Malingering is defined as “the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated
physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as . . . avoiding work
[or] obtaining financial compensation.” AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 683 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-IV],
https://justines2010blog.files.wordpress.com/2011/03/dsm-iv.pdf. The newest edition, DSM-V,
does not specifically discuss malingering or criteria for evaluating malingering.
151. Lawrence Joseph, The Causation Issue in Workers’ Compensation Mental Disability
Cases: An Analysis, Solutions, and a Perspective, 36 VAND. L. REV. 263, 273 (1983) (“The spectre
of fraud has influenced judicial attitudes toward mental injuries.”). But see Lisa Cullen, The Myth
of Workers’ Compensation Fraud, FRONTLINE PBS (2013), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/workplace/etc/fraud.html (asserting that the insurance industry’s focus on
malingering may be unfounded, as studies show that only 1–2% of all workers’ compensation
claims are fraudulent).
152. 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04 (Matthew Bender ed.):
[I]t is no longer realistic to draw a line between what is ‘nervous’ and what is
‘physical’ . . . [p]erhaps, in earlier years, when much less was known about
mental and nervous injuries and their relation to ‘physical’ symptoms and
behavior, there was an excuse, on grounds of evidentiary difficulties, for
ruling out recoveries based on such injuries . . . in workmen’s compensation.
But the excuse no longer exists.
153. DSM-IV, supra note 150, at 683.
154. Tucker, supra note 19, at 479.
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for decades, studies of PTSD patients have been both published and peer
reviewed, and “PTSD has been accepted as textbook science by the
scientific community for [over] twenty years.”155 PTSD testimony meets
all of the Daubert criteria.156
While allowing mental–mental injuries into the realm of workers’
compensation claims would not circumvent a battle of the experts,157 this
is not a battle unique to mental–mental injury claims. One of the
hallmarks of the current workers’ compensation system is a highly
specialized trier of fact that considers expert testimony with an eye
toward the concern that the claimant may be malingering, exaggerating
his or her injuries, or attempting to claim an injury unrelated to
employment.158 Experts are routinely admitted to testify regarding the
legitimacy and causative nature of a claimant’s physical injuries or
mental injuries caused by physical trauma.159 Courts already depend on
triers of fact to detect and weed out fraudulent or illegitimate claims.160
It follows, then, that fact finders should similarly be able to consider
evidence presented “to determine whether a mental or emotional injury
has arisen from and in the course of employment, just as they do for
physical injuries.”161 It would produce a far more reasonable and
equitable result to allow the trier of fact to consider evidence that a
claimant is malingering, rather than to assume that all mental–mental
claimants are malingering.
Finally, allowing expert testimony to be considered to prove or
disprove a PTSD claim would also produce a perception in the eyes of
the claimant that the results are fair. Though experts will still be necessary
to determine claim validity, “resources expended by the parties would be
more appropriately channeled into considering the merits of the case, as

155. Garcia-Rill & Beecher-Monas, supra note 38, at 30.
156. Id. The Daubert standard requires a judge to “examine the proffered testimony for
falsifiability, error rate and the existence of protocols, peer review and publication, and general
acceptance.” Id. at 29.
157. Deirdre M. Smith, Diagnosing Liability: The Legal History of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 45 (2011) (“Evidence of PTSD is generally offered through expert
witnesses . . . [such as] treating clinicians who describe their diagnostic impressions of their
patients or forensic examiners retained by one of the parties to evaluate an individual and render
an opinion on a specific issue tied to the civil or criminal litigation.”).
158. Tucker, supra note 19, at 479–80.
159. Smith, supra note 157, at 45 (discussing the use of experts and the role of the courts as
fact finders); Tucker, supra note 19, at 480.
160. Tucker, supra note 19, at 480.
161. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 157, at 51 (“In short, with few exceptions, courts
generally do not use rules of evidence as a basis to restrict PTSD-based expert testimony. Rather,
reasoning that due to its inclusion in [the] DSM[,] PTSD is a ‘medically recognized disorder,’
[and] courts regard it as relevant, useful, and appropriate for fact finders to . . . rely upon the
adversarial process to flesh out the limitations of such evidence.”).
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opposed to peripheral issues.”162 No matter the result, claimants will feel
that they did all they could, and their money spent fighting for their claim
was at least channeled toward the appropriate issues. Even if the claimant
is unsuccessful, at minimum she would have the dignity of having her
claim heard on its merits, rather than automatically dispelled without
consideration.163
2. The Proverbial Floodgate Concern
Courts have voiced the concern that “recognizing ‘compensation for
any mental diseases and disorders caused by on-the-job stressful events
or conditions would . . . open a floodgate for workers who succumb to
the everyday pressures of life.’”164 In 2007, when the Florida Senate
considered the original first responder amendment,165 the Banking and
Insurance Senate Committee prepared an economic impact statement
discussing the potential fiscal ramifications of the bill.166 Unsurprisingly,
it was estimated that allowing first responders to recover medical benefits
for purely mental injury would increase the overall cost of compensating
the first responder class.167 It also follows that loosening compensability
standards will likely add claims,168 though the report indicated that
broadening the benefits available to first responders would only
marginally increase the amount of first responder claims.169 While the
decision to refrain from expanding coverage to full indemnification is not
discussed, the committee’s apparent controlling concern was what
economic impact loosening coverage might have on local government

162. Bailey, supra note 29, at 527.
163. Id. at 528. Research has shown that “litigants are more likely to be satisfied with the
outcome [of a claim] when they perceive the decision-making process is fair.” Id. at 527–28.
164. Tucker, supra note 19, at 478; see also 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04(2) (stating
that in some jurisdictions, due to concerns about flooding claims over workplace stress, states
have placed limitations on such claims even in the absence of legislation).
165. Referenced in Section II.A.
166. PROFESSIONAL STAFF ANALYSIS, supra note 147, at 2.
167. Id. at 2 (“The National Council on Compensation Insurers (NCCI) estimates that costs
for first responder classes would increase 5.9 – 6.4 percent ($12.2 – 13.0 million) if this proposal
were enacted in its current form.”). Because individual self-insurers do not report data to the
NCCI, they were not included in that estimate; however, additional costs for individual selfinsurers that employ first responders, such as state and local governmental agencies, are expected
as well. Id.
168. Id. at 11 (“Depending on judicial interpretation, compensability of any mental injury
‘occurring as a manifestation of an employment’ may not only allow compensation of first
responders traumatized by the suffering they’ve seen in the course of their employment, but may
also allow compensation as a result of the stress from routine activities, interactions and
employment decisions.”).
169. Id. (estimating that the combined impact of the provisions of the new statute would
increase the number of compensable claims for first responders by 1%).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss6/4

26

Foels: Rescuing the Rescuer: Reforming How Florida’s Workers’ Compensati

2017]

RESCUING THE RESCUER

1465

and the tax payers that would ultimately have to foot the bill for the
increase in claims.170
Several bills proposed in the 2017 legislative session aimed to expand
the coverage available to first responders who sustain purely mental
injury.171 However, the bills were proposed too late, and were unable to
make it through the committee review process before the end of the
legislative session.172 The bill that progressed the furthest, SB 1088, was
specifically targeted at authorizing indemnity payments for first
responders who sustained mental or nervous injury, and loosening
evidentiary standards for such claims.173 The Banking and Insurance
Senate Committee likewise prepared a report for this bill, ultimately
approving the bill by unanimous vote.174 The report stated that, according
to the National Council on Compensation Insurance, “the impact on
overall workers’ compensation costs would be expected to be small, since
the data reported . . . show that first responders represent approximately
2.5 percent of statewide losses in Florida.”175 However, the Committee
ultimately concluded that it could not predict with certainty the fiscal
impact the bill will have on the private or government sectors, though it
noted that a small increase in both claims and cost is expected.176
It flows logically that loosening compensability standards for first
responders will likely increase the amount of first responder claims. As
more injuries are brought into the compensability spectrum, injured
employees such as Officer Realin will file a claim and (hopefully) receive
compensation. The costs of providing full indemnification for first
responders may not be as great as many people fear, however. First

170. Id. at 10–13 (discussing the fiscal impact of the bill on private sector and governmental
sector entities).
171. S. 516, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017); H.R. 1019; 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla.
2017); S. 1088, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017).
172. See Julie Gargotta, Bill Expanding Workers’ Compensation for First Responders in
Jeopardy, NEWS 13 (Apr. 3, 2017, 6:14 PM), http://www.mynews13.com/content/news/
cfnews13/news/article.html/content/news/articles/cfn/2017/4/3/bill_expanding_worke.html.
173. BILL ANALYSIS AND FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT, FLA. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING &
INS. 1, 1 (Apr. 17, 2017) [hereinafter BILL ANALYSIS], https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/
Bill/2017/1088/Analyses/2017s01088.bi.PDF.
174. Mike Holfeld, PTSD Legislation Unanimously Passes Florida Subcommittee,
CLICKORLANDO (Apr. 17, 2017, 7:37 PM), http://www.clickorlando.com/news/ptsd-legislationunanimously-passes-florida-sub-committee.
175. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 9.
176. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 9–10. Regarding the private sector impact, the
Committee estimated that the impact on overall system costs is expected to be small—less than
1%. Id. at 9. In the government sector context, there is likewise a potential for a small increase in
cost, though if a state employee is unable to return to work due to particularly severe injury, his
claim may result in a higher cost depending on his age and salary. Id. at 10.
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responders represent only a small portion of the general populace,177 so
compensating them with indemnification benefits will not deal a
crippling blow to a provider’s fiscal budget. Additionally, it may be more
costly for governments to not fully compensate first responders, as the
injured will be slower to return to work or work performance may suffer
as a result of returning to work before the employee is ready. 178 Such
hindered work performance may also result in unintended mistakes and
negligence, exposing governmental agencies to increased liability in
tort.179 If first responders with mental injury such as PTSD are not given
sufficient time or support to enable them to recover, they may not be able
to earn income through employment and could end up on welfare or other
governmental support anyway.180 Governmental employers may be better
off simply paying higher insurance premiums for increased coverage
instead of dealing with the effects of undercompensation.
While it is true that indemnification for legitimate first responder
mental injury claims will undoubtedly impose at least some additional
cost to local governments, the question of whether such coverage should
be provided comes down to a cost–benefit analysis. Such an analysis
“inevitably incorporate[s] political and moral judgments about the proper
distribution of resources.”181 A society must both recalibrate its moral
compass and view the situation with economic pragmatism; it must ask
whether the cost of its first responders going undercompensated for
legitimate mental injury outweighs the small economic benefit of
withholding full compensation. While evidentiary and floodgate
concerns may arguably outweigh the need to compensate every Average
Joe for a stress-related mental injury suffered on the job, such concerns
do not carry the same weight when applied to first responders. In light of
this, applying the Castellanos and Westphal standards to first responders
177. See KRISTINA SCHAFER ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUALS
EMPLOYMENT AMONG FIRST RESPONDERS i (2015), https://www.dol.gov/asp/evaluation/
analytics-reports/CharacteristicsOfIndividualsAndEmploymentAmongFirstResponders.pdf
(estimating nearly 1.2 million people work as police, firefighters, and emergency medical
technicians (“EMTs”)). The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that approximately 324 million people
live in the United States today. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited June 21, 2017).
178. Tucker, supra note 19, at 480 (citing a British study published in the British Medical
Journal that found “impaired efficiency at work associated with mental health problems” costs
the United Kingdom approximately £15.1 billion, or $22.5 billion, a year).
179. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF AGENCY § 243 (AM. LAW INST. 1933) (“A
master is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the negligent conduct of servants within
the scope of employment.”).
180. See generally Chana Joffe-Walt, Unfit for Work: The Startling Rise of Disability in
America, NPR (2013), http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work/ (stating that in the past three decades,
the number of Americans who are on disability has skyrocketed, and that every month 14 million
Americans collect a disability check from the government).
181. Tucker, supra note 19, at 481.
AND
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clearly shows that categorical denial of indemnification results not only
in moral impropriety, but infringes upon constitutionally guaranteed
rights as well.
D. Applying Castellanos and Westphal
To make applying Castellanos and Westphal to the first responder
circumstance easier to articulate and understand, a reiteration of the
standards used by the Florida Supreme Court is helpful. Recall that, in
Castellanos, the controlling questions were (1) whether the concern of
the legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse the
legislature legitimately desired to avoid; and (2) whether the expense and
other difficulties of individual determinations justifies the inherent
imprecision of a conclusive presumption.182 In Westphal, the court
focused on (1) whether the legislature could show an overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of the right to pursue an action in
tort; and (2) whether a viable alternative existed for meeting such a
pressing public necessity could be shown.183
The first prong of the Castellanos standard, whether a concern of the
legislature was reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse the
legislature legitimately desired to avoid, is not met in the first responder
circumstance. The abuse to be avoided here is the possibility of fraudulent
claims and malingering, and a decade or two ago such a concern might
have justified limiting recovery for purely mental injury.184 However, due
to advancements in diagnosis and treatment, and an increase in the
amount of knowledge about PTSD and mental health generally, the fear
of fraud is no longer a legitimate reason for limiting first responder
recovery.185 In Castellanos, the court reasoned that a concern about
excessive fee awards is insufficient to constitute a legitimate legislative
concern, because safeguards are in place to defend against that risk.186
Similarly, safeguards are routinely set forth in the area of workers’
compensation law to protect against fraud and malingering.187 Like any
other compensable mental injury claim, claimants must come before an
experienced, specialized fact finder; they must establish their injuries by
clear and convincing medical evidence presented by a licensed
psychiatrist; and they must meet all the criteria established in the most

182. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2016).
183. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311, 322 (Fla. 2016).
184. See Subsection III.C.1 for a discussion of evidentiary concerns, and why concerns of
malingering and fraudulent claims are largely overblown.
185. See supra notes 152–56 and accompanying text.
186. Castellanos, 192 So. 3d at 444.
187. For a discussion of how courts can protect against fraudulent claims, see Subsection
III.C.1.a.
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recent edition of the diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders,
before they can receive full compensation.188
The fact is, PTSD incidence is significantly higher in law enforcement
officers and other first responders than the rest of the general
population.189 First responders are routinely exposed to stressful,
traumatic events while performing their duties.190 The Banking and
Insurance Senate Committee acknowledged this fact in their report on SB
1088, and recognized that first responders are already part of a “special
risk class” by virtue of the exceptionally demanding nature of their
work.191 Furthermore, the report provided statistical evidence that,
according to the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, the prevalence of
PTSD in first responders is estimated to be as high as twenty to forty
percent, while PTSD prevalence in the general population sits around
seven to eight percent.192 There is therefore a much greater chance that a
first responder claim of PTSD or other mental injury will be legitimate
and stem from workplace stimuli, and a much greater chance that a
blanket denial of indemnification would wrongfully deny coverage to
first responders with legitimate mental injury. Similar to the court’s
reasoning in Castellanos,193 the first prong fails here because although
the conclusive presumption achieves the goal of standardization of
coverage, it does so in a manner that lacks any relationship to the actual
188. FLA. STAT. § 440.093(2) (2017).
189. Bailey, supra note 29, at 519; DSM-V, supra note 38, at 276 (“Rates of PTSD are higher
among veterans and others whose vocation increases the risk of traumatic exposure (e.g., police,
firefighters, emergency medical personnel).”); Kulbarsh, supra note 28 (“Law enforcement
officers are also at a much higher rate of developing a cumulative form of PTSD related to their
exposure to multiple traumatic events.”); Lainie Rutkow et al., Protecting the Mental Health of
First Responders: Legal and Ethical Considerations, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 56 (“Studies have
demonstrated that, after participating in disaster responses, first responders experience elevated
rates of depression, stress disorders, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for months and
sometimes years.”).
190. Rutkow et al., supra note 189, at 56 (“[First responders] often work long hours under
stressful conditions, witnessing the human harms, physical destruction, and psychological
devastation that can accompany disasters.”); DSM-V, supra note 38, at 271 (listing “first
responders collecting human remains” and “police officers repeatedly being exposed to details of
child abuse” as examples of repeated or extreme exposure to traumatic events).
191. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 5 (“[T]he Legislature recognized that certain
employees must, as an essential function of their positions, perform work that is physically
demanding or that requires extraordinary agility and mental acuity.”). A member of the Special
Risk Class may retire at an earlier age and is eligible to receive higher disability and death benefits.
Id.
192. BILL ANALYSIS, supra note 173, at 9–10.
193. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 444 (Fla. 2016) (stating that while the
legislative intent to standardize attorney’s fees is accomplished by the conclusive presumption of
section 440.34, Florida Statutes, the presumption does so in a manner that lacks any relationship
to the amount of time or effort actually expended by the attorney, and is therefore
unconstitutional).
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merits of the claim.194 It is now understood how much greater at risk first
responders are for developing PTSD, and it is possible to diagnose and
treat such mental injuries and detect potential malingering. Because of
these developments, the concern about abuse is no longer reasonable
when applied to first responders, and it no longer outweighs the benefit
of providing full compensation for proven, legitimate claims.
The second prong of the Castellanos standard, whether the expense
and other difficulties of individual determinations justify the inherent
imprecision of a conclusive presumption, also fails when applied to first
responders. The workers’ compensation system is a highly specialized,
streamlined approach geared towards providing employees coverage in a
quick and efficient manner.195 Workers’ compensation courts are skilled
in determining whether an employee’s claimed injury is legitimate, and
whether the injury sustained arose “out of work performed in the course
and scope of employment.”196 Courts already evaluate testimony
regarding legitimacy of mental injury claims, including testimony from
expert psychiatrists and psychologists.197 It follows then, that courts
should be able to evaluate testimony about the legitimacy or seriousness
of first responders’ mental–mental injury with relatively little additional
expense.
Due to the ease with which Florida courts could incorporate purely
mental injury into the spectrum of compensable injuries for first
responders, it cannot be said that any perceived additional expense
outweighs allowing indemnification, other than the cost of
indemnification itself.198 Just as courts can assess reasonableness on a
case-by-case basis with regard to attorney’s fees, so too can they assess
the reasonableness and legitimacy of mental injury. Without the ability to
consider the merits of each claim individually, there remains the risk that
the result will be “arbitrary, unjust, and grossly inadequate.”199 By
compensating first responders with medical benefits, the court is already
acknowledging the legitimacy of their mental injury claim. Denial of
much needed indemnification seems arbitrary and unreasonable, and is
violative of the constitutional right to due process.
194. An individual, case-by-case determination would far better serve the legislative intent
of the law, as it would ensure coverage for legitimate claimants while keeping the burden on the
claimant to ultimately prove her injury, deterring disingenuous claims.
195. See Subsection III.C.1.
196. FLA. STAT. § 440.09 (2016); Tucker, supra note 19, at 280.
197. See Subsection III.C.1.
198. For an explanation of why the cost of indemnification for first responders who sustain
purely mental injury would be marginal, see Subsection III.C.2.
199. Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431, 448 (Fla. 2016) (using the same quoted
language to describe the unconstitutional result of the section 440.015 presumption, in which the
JCC was barred from assessing the reasonableness of fee awards on a case-by-case basis and
deviating from that presumption when equity demanded).
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No overpowering public necessity for depriving first responders the
right to sue in tort to recover indemnification benefits can be shown.
Therefore, the categorical denial of indemnity dictated by section
112.1815 fails the first prong of the Westphal standard.200 Evidentiary
and economic concerns are largely overblown in the first responder
context. While some economic impact is unavoidable, opponents to
expanding coverage would be hard pressed to argue that such marginal
additional expenditure is not worthwhile. In the long term, expanding
coverage would not only benefit employers and society as a whole by
maintaining healthier, more diligent first responder employees,201 but
would also allocate societal resources to a deserving and noble cause. In
the first responder circumstance, the legislative concerns previously
discussed do not outweigh the strong possibility that a first responder’s
meritorious claim will be categorically barred from court and will go
unheard and unrecompensed.
Even if legislative concerns rose to the level of justifying a limitation
of benefits for purely mental injury, it cannot be shown that a less harmful
alternative does not exist as the second prong of the Westphal standard
requires.202 Other states have taken creative approaches to the issue of
how to handle mental–mental injuries, incorporating various criteria and
causal nexus standards that must be satisfied before an injury may be
compensated.203 Therefore, even if the aforementioned concerns proved
to be overpowering, procedural and evidentiary safeguards could be put
in place that allowed legitimate claims to be compensated while
efficiently weeding out claims without merit.
Because Florida Statutes section 440.11(1) dictates that workers’
compensation is the exclusive remedy available to claimant
employees,204 first responders who suffer PTSD or other purely mental
injury are unable to pursue additional recovery outside of the workers’
compensation system. This result frustrates the purpose of workers’
compensation statutes as the statutes no longer “provide ‘adequate,
sufficient, and . . . preferable safeguards for an employee who is injured
on the job.”205 For claimants who have a bona fide diagnosis of PTSD or

200. Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg, 194 So. 3d 311, 322 (Fla. 2016).
201. See supra notes 178–80 and accompanying text.
202. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322.
203. Bailey, supra note 29, at 514–18 (discussing methods used by various states that include
requiring mental injuries to be caused by gradual stress, or requiring that the injury-inducing stress
be usual and/or sudden); see also Burke, supra note 51, at 909–13 (discussing how Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and New York approach mental–mental claim evaluation).
204. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (2017).
205. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 315 (quoting Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (1973)); see also
4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04 (stating that, in light of advances in knowledge about mental
injury, any state that continues to withhold the benefits of workers’ compensation from a worker
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other mental disorder, they are left to struggle with a serious condition
that hinders not only their ability to perform employment functions, but
impacts their daily lives and families as well.206 A categorical denial of
indemnification for mental–mental injury suffered by first responders
does not provide any sort of adequate or sufficient safeguards for the
injured employee because it treats legitimate mental workplace injuries
as if they do not exist.207 The workers’ compensation employer–
employee bargain effectively traps the employee in a state of limbo,
resulting in an unconscionable imbalance of bargaining power. Florida
Statutes section 112.1815 therefore does not constitute a “reasonable
alternative”208 to tort litigation, and should be held violative of the
constitutional guarantee of access to courts. While not a complete denial
of all benefits, the arbitrary denial of indemnification surpasses the
tipping point discussed in Westphal209 and crosses the line into
unconstitutionality.
IV. PROPOSED CHANGES & METHODS FOR EVALUATION
Naturally, the primary change advocated for in this Note is the
inclusion of indemnification as a benefit available to first responders who
suffer purely mental injury such as PTSD. This change could be realized
by simply amending the current first responder statute by adding the
words “and indemnity” after providing for medical benefits. In addition,
it would be useful to briefly discuss a method to be adopted by Florida
courts that would assist with handling these types of claims. In light of
Florida’s apprehension and resistance to allowing such mental injury
claims, the proposed method may offer some guidance that further
mitigates concerns surrounding mental–mental claims. This Part provides
a model statute to be adopted by the Florida legislature as well as a
general methodology for evaluating mental injury claims of first
responders.
A. Model Statute
The fix is an easy one. The definition of the term “first responder”
provided in the current Florida first responder workers’ compensation
statute is already adequate, and sufficiently covers all individuals at a
heightened risk of being exposed to traumatic or stress-inducing

does “unjustifiable violence to the intent of the workers’ compensation act, for reasons that are
without support in either legal or medical theory”).
206. Burke, supra note 51, at 907.
207. Id.
208. Westphal, 194 So. 3d at 322.
209. Id. at 323.
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stimuli.210 However, if concern over the breadth of the statute persists, a
new definition can be constructed to encompass only first responders who
have been exposed to specific stimuli or traumatic experiences. 211 The
advocated change addresses section 112.1815(1)(3) of the statute, that
currently states “only medical benefits . . . shall be payable for mental or
nervous injury” and “payment of indemnity . . . may not be made unless
a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies
the mental or nervous injury.”212 To adequately and equitably compensate
first responders who suffer this type of injury, the statute should be
changed to read: “medical benefits and indemnity . . . shall be payable for
mental or nervous injury” and the provision specifically addressing a
denial of indemnity should be deleted.213 Additionally, a provision should
be added to further define “indemnity” to clarify what specific benefits
fall under the purview of that term. Lastly, legislators would be wise to
add an additional provision to section 440.093 that summarizes the first
responder exception to claiming mental or nervous injuries. This addition
would ensure that no conflict remains between section 112.1815 and
section 440.093. These changes would ensure first responders who suffer
proven and legitimate claims of PTSD or other mental injury will be fully
and fairly compensated for their injury and the purpose of the workers’
compensation statutes will be fulfilled.
B. Suggested Methodology for Mental–Mental Injury
Claim Evaluation
An ideal methodology for reviewing first responder mental–mental
injury claims would be one that incorporates both subjective and
objective components. Such a method would mitigate the concern of
malingering and fraud, yet still allow claimants who genuinely believe
they have suffered a legitimate mental injury their day in court and a
chance at redress. In short, the new standard of reviewing mental injury
claims, such as a claim of PTSD, would first involve the subjective
determination of whether the first responder genuinely believes that he
suffered a legitimate mental illness caused by workplace stimuli. Judicial
fact finders would hear testimony presented by the claimant and experts
210. FLA. STAT. § 112.1815(1) (2017) (defining “first responder” under the statute as a law
enforcement officer, a firefighter, or an emergency medical technician or paramedic employed by
the state or local government, including volunteers).
211. Criteria from particular mental injuries could be selected from the DSM-IV and DSMV to accomplish this. See DSM-V, supra note 38, at 271 (listing examples of PTSD-inducing
traumatic events).
212. § 112.1815(1)(3).
213. Id. § 112.1815(3) (“However, payment of indemnity as provided in s. 440.15 may not
be made unless a physical injury arising out of injury as a first responder accompanies the mental
or nervous injury.”).
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and determine whether or not the employee’s belief is legitimate. Then,
the judge would objectively determine through the evidence and
testimony presented whether, by clear and convincing evidence,214 the
mental injury was actually caused215 by workplace stimuli.
When evaluating an employee’s workers’ compensation claim it
should be imperative that she actually believed she sustained a legitimate
injury. It may seem obvious, but inevitably courts will have to hear a
claimant’s statements regarding the seriousness of the injury sustained,
and substantiation of those statements is the first step in preventing fraud
and abuse of the workers’ compensations system. The Michigan
legislature, for example, adopted an approach in 1978 that if a claimant
factually establishes that he honestly believes some personal injury
incurred during the ordinary course of his employment and that his
employment caused his disability, then the claimant is entitled to
compensation.216 With such a standard, the fact finder uses a “subjective
approach focus[ing] on whether the claimant is being honest or is
malingering.”217 This is where the malingering factors discussed in
Subsection III.C.1 and other DSM-V criteria will come into play. This
“subjective causal nexus”218 test alone is flawed, however, because of its
failure to take into account whether an injury was actually objectively
sustained, and whether the injury was actually caused by stimuli in the
workplace, a fundamental tenet of the workers’ compensation system.219
The whole point of the workers’ compensation system is to compensate
employees for injury sustained while at work; such a goal would be
unduly frustrated by not requiring a claimant to prove workplace stimuli
was the underlying cause of their injury.220 While requiring the claimant
to prove she actually believes she suffered a mental injury is important,
214. Id.
215. Using the same causal nexus standard cited in Florida Statutes section 440.093 that the
workplace stimuli “must be and remain the major contributing cause of the mental or nervous
condition and the compensable physical injury as determined by reasonable medical certainty
must be at least 50 percent responsible for the mental or nervous condition as compared to all
other contributing causes combined.” § 440.093(2).
216. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475 (referencing the Michigan Supreme Court decision in
Deziel v. Difco Labs, Inc., 394 Mich. 466 (1975) that prompted the legislative adoption in 1978).
The Michigan legislature discontinued that adopted standard by 1982, however. 4 LARSON, supra
note 53, § 56.04 (amending the standard to reflect an objective component: that “mental
disabilities shall be compensable when arising out of actual events of employment, not unfounded
perceptions thereof”).
217. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475; see also 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04 (stating that
at the heart of the Deziel decision was the notion that, if the claimant honestly, albeit mistakenly
believed he sustained disability due to a work injury, the resulting disability should be
compensable).
218. 4 LARSON, supra note 53, § 56.04.
219. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475, 483.
220. Id. at 483.
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an objective standard of reviewing that belief and for determining the
causal nexus aspect of the claim is critical.
Therefore, the second component of the proposed standard is an
objective determination of whether the claimant actually sustained
verifiable injury, and whether the injury sustained was objectively caused
by workplace stimuli. This test poses a significantly more difficult hurdle
for claimants to clear than just simply proving they believe they sustained
a compensable injury. As previously discussed, a battle of the experts and
other evidentiary proof is necessary to determine whether the claimant
suffered a legitimate mental injury and whether the injury was caused by
workplace stimuli.221 Fact finders will be tasked with objectively
evaluating a claimant’s mental state, and should lean heavily on
psychology and psychiatry experts well versed with the most recent
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders in fulfilling this
task.
New Jersey adheres to this objective standard of review,222 making no
distinction between physical and mental injuries, but requires a claimant
to produce “objective evidence that supports a medical diagnosis of
psychiatric disability” to support his claim of mental disorder and a
workplace causal connection.223 In articulating this standard, a New
Jersey court framed the issue as “not whether a workers’ compensation
claimant malingered,” but instead focused primarily on whether the
“stress, admittedly subjective, stemmed from objectively proven stressful
work conditions, rather than conditions which only the petitioner found
stressful (or, perhaps, conditions which were not shown objectively to
exist at all).”224 Other states have also adopted different wrinkles to their
objective-causal-nexus standards. In addition to requiring objective
evidence of mental injury and a causal nexus to workplace stimuli,
Pennsylvania requires the workplace incident to have been an “abnormal
221. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
222. Burke, supra note 51, at 901. New Jersey’s standard has been dubbed “the Goyden Test”
and includes five prongs that must all be met before an injury, physical or mental, may be
compensated:
(1) the working conditions must be objectively stressful, (2) there must be
evidence showing that the claimant responded to them as stressful, (3) the
objectively stressful working conditions must be ‘peculiar’ to the work
environment, (4) there must be objective evidence supporting a medical
opinion of the resulting psychiatric disability in addition to the ‘bare statement
of the patient,’ and (5) the workplace exposure must have been a ‘material’
cause of the disability.
Id. at 901–02.
223. Id. at 911.
224. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475–76 (quoting Goyden v. State Judiciary, 256 N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 438 (1991)).
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working condition.”225 Under this additional requirement, a claimant
would be unable to recover for mental injury caused by a particular event
if that employee received specific training for that type of event, or if that
event was common for the type of work the employee does.226 Such a
requirement could have obvious applicability to the first responder
circumstance, though unfettered speculation of what is a foreseeable
event for first responders engaged in dangerous work could have negative
implications.227 New York employs a similar standard, requiring the
stress inducing accident to be “greater than an ordinary work
environment.”228
No matter what standard the Florida legislature adopts, an objective
component is critical, as it helps prevent fraudulent claims while allowing
workers with genuine mental injury a form of redress.229 While
observation of a claimant may establish subjective belief in mental or
emotional disability,230 the causal nexus between observable and
verifiable symptoms must also be established. To establish such
causation, an objective standard of review is necessary.
CONCLUSION
First responders are an integral part of disaster relief efforts, and when
disaster strikes, the affected localities expect first responders to be ready
and willing to assist, even if it means putting their own well-being at risk.
While it is true that first responders take on this selfless responsibility
voluntarily, at minimum they should have assurances that, in the event
they develop adverse health conditions related to their emergency
response duties, they will be adequately compensated by workers’
compensation benefits. The Florida legislature must reconsider its stance
on first responder mental injury, and provide first responders with
adequate and complete support. We as a society have a duty to take care
of the men and women who have selflessly volunteered to take care of
us.

225. Burke, supra note 51, at 909–10 (“Although there is no bright-line test for abnormal
working conditions . . . claims have been denied if a claimant received training for a certain type
of event or if such an event was foreseeable for the type of work at issue.”).
226. Id. at 910 (providing the example of a convenience store clerk who was given training
on how to handle armed robberies, and concluding that a subsequent armed robbery would likely
fail the abnormal working condition test because of its foreseeability and the prior training the
employee received).
227. In the case of Officer Realin, this requirement could lead to litigation over whether a
mass shooting, and removal of bodies of victims from that shooting, was foreseeable for his line
of employment.
228. Burke, supra note 51, at 912.
229. Id.
230. Tucker, supra note 19, at 475.
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